We propose a categorical data synthesizer with a quantifiable disclosure risk. Our algorithm, named Perturbed Gibbs Sampler, can handle high-dimensional categorical data that are often intractable to represent as contingency tables. The algorithm extends a multiple imputation strategy for fully synthetic data by utilizing feature hashing and non-parametric distribution approximations. California Patient Discharge data are used to demonstrate statistical properties of the proposed synthesizing methodology. Marginal and conditional distributions, as well as the coefficients of regression models built on the synthesized data are compared to those obtained from the original data. Intruder scenarios are simulated to evaluate disclosure risks of the synthesized data from multiple angles. Limitations and extensions of the proposed algorithm are also discussed.
Introduction
Public use data, which are often released by government and other data collecting agencies, typically need to to satisfy two competing objectives: maintaining relevant statistical properties of the original data and protecting privacy of individuals. To address these two goals, various statistical disclosure limitation techniques have been developed (Willenborg and de Waal, 2001 ). Some popular disclosure techniques are data swapping (Dalenius and Reiss, 1978; Fienberg and McIntyre, 2005) , top-coding, feature generalization such as k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) or l-diversity (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007) , and additive random noise with measurement error models (Fuller, 1993) . Each method has distinct utility and risk aspects. In practice, a disclosure limitation technique is carefully chosen by domain experts and statisticians. Sometimes, multiple techniques are mixed and applied to a single dataset to achieve better privacy protection before being released to the public (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2013) . Such public use datasets have served as valuable information sources for decision makings in economics, healthcare, and business analytics.
The generation of synthetic data, proposed by Rubin (1993) , is an alternative approach to data-transforming disclosure techniques. Multiple imputation, which was originally developed to impute missing values in survey responses (Rubin, 1987) , is used to generate either partially or fully synthetic data. As synthetic data preserves the structure and resolution of the original data, preprocessing steps and analytical procedures on synthetic data can be effortlessly transferred to the original data. This aspect has contributed to popular adoption of synthetic data in diverse research areas. Thus far, there has been notable progress on valid inferences using synthetic data and extensions to different applications: Abowd and Woodcock (2001) synthesized a French longitudinal linked database, and Raghunathan et al. (2003) provided general methods for obtaining valid inferences using multiply imputed data. Beyond typically used generalized linear models, decision trees models, such as CART and Random forests, can also be used as imputation models in multiple imputation (Reiter, 2003; Caiola and Reiter, 2010) . Some illustrative empirical studies have used U.S. census data , German business database , and U.S. American Community Survey (Sakshaug and Raghunathan, 2011) .
A very different approach to imputing missing values in binary or binarized datasets can be taken using association rule mining. Vreenken and Siebes (2008) used the minimum description length principle to distributional information about the original data.
The proposed algorithm generates realistic but not real synthetic samples by calibrating a privacy parameter α. In addition, the exponentially number of cells in a contingency table is avoided by using multiple imputation and feature hashing h(x −i ) as follows:
where Pr D,α (x i | h(x −i )) is the compressed and perturbed conditional distribution of the ith feature and M is the total number of features. The joint probability distribution is represented as M conditional distributions. Note that the conditional distribution in Equation (1) is not exact. The full condition x −i is compressed using a hash function h(x −i ) and perturbed by a privacy parameter α. Ignoring these two additional components i.e. h(x −i ) and α, if the probability is modeled using generalized linear models, then the proposed algorithm is the same as a multiple imputation algorithm for fully synthetic data. The proposed synthesizer is named as Perturbed Gibbs Sampler (PeGS). This is because the proposed sampling procedure can iterate more than once unlike multiple imputation, and is similar to the Gibbs sampler. Table 1 summarizes synthesizer models that are described in this paper. More details on this list and privacy guarantees for both one iteration and multiple iterations are described in Section 3. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we cover the basics of multiple imputation and -differential privacy. In Section 3, the details of the PeGS algorithms are illustrated, and the privacy guarantees of the proposed algorithms are derived. We demonstrate our algorithms using California Patient Discharge dataset in Section 4. Finally, we discuss the limitation of the proposed methods and future extensions in Section 5.
Background
In this section, we overview multiple imputation, -differential privacy, and l-diversity. They are primary building blocks of our synthesizer algorithm. We start by describing the original multiple imputation method for missing values, then illustrate its application to generating fully synthetic data. Next, we visit the definition of -differential privacy and some approaches to implement differentially private algorithms. The definition of l-diversity and its variant definition for synthetic data are illustrated.
Multiple Imputation
Multiple imputation was originally developed to impute missing values in survey responses (Rubin, 1987) , and it was later applied to generate synthetic data. Let us start from the missing value imputation setting. Consider a survey with two variables x and z, D = {(x, z)}, where some of the x responses are missing. Let D obs be a subset of D where both x and z are observed. The unobserved responses are imputed using samples from a posterior model as follows:
Note that the posterior 1 is modeled using the observed subset, and often obtained using generalized linear models or Bayesian Bootstraping methods (Reiter, 2005a) . To generate synthetic data, the process is repeated on the observed responses x and z:
After this sampling step, a subset of fully synthetic responses is randomly sampled, and disclosed as public use data. Typically, this entire process is repeated independently K times to obtain K different synthetic datasets. Raghunathan et al. (2003) showed that valid inferences can be obtained from multiply imputed synthetic data. Let Q be a function of (x, z). For example, Q may represent the population mean of (x, z) or the population regression coefficients of x on z. Let q i and v i be the estimate of Q and its variance obtained from the ith synthetic dataset. Then, valid inferences on Q can be obtained as follows:
These two quantitiesq K and T s estimate the original Q and its variance.
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (Dwork, 2006 ) is a mathematical measure of privacy that quantifies disclosure risks of statistical functions. To satisfy -differential privacy, the inclusion or exclusion of any particular record in data cannot affect the outcome of functions by much. Specifically, a randomized function f : D → f (D) provides -differential privacy, if it satisfies:
where D 1 and D 2 differ by at most one element, and ∀S ∈ Range(f (D)). For a synthetic sample, this definition can be interpreted as follows (McClure and Reiter, 2012) :
where x represents a random sample from synthesizers. In other words, a data synthesizer Pr D (x) isdifferentially private, if the probabilities of generating x from D 1 and D 2 are indistinguishable to the extent of exp( ). Several mechanisms have been developed to achieve differential privacy. For numeric outputs, the most popular technique is to add Laplace noise with mean 0 and scale ∆f / where ∆f is the L 1 sensitivity of function f . Exponential mechanism ) is a general differential privacy mechanism that can be applied to non-numeric outputs. For categorical data, Dirichlet prior can be used as a noise mechanism to achieve differential privacy (Machanavajjhala et al., 2008; McClure and Reiter, 2012) .
l-diversity
A certain combination of features can identify an individual from an anonymized dataset, even if personal identifiers, such as driver license number and social security number, are removed from a dataset. Such threats are commonly prevented by generalizing or suppressing features; for example, ZIP codes with small population are replaced by corresponding county names (generalization), or can be replaced by * (suppression). Sweeney (2002) proposed a privacy definition for measuring the degree of such feature generalization and suppression, k-anonymity. To adhere the k-anonymity principle, each row in a dataset should be indistinguishable with at least k − 1 other rows.
The definition of k-anonymity, however, does not include two important aspects of data privacy: feature diversity and attackers' background knowledge. Machanavajjhala (2007) illustrated two potential threats to a k-anonymized dataset, then proposed a new privacy criterion, l-diversity. The definition of l-diversity states that the diversity of sensitive features should be kept within a block of samples. There are several ways of achieving l-diversity; in this paper, we use Entropy l-diversity. A dataset is Entropy l-diverse if where 1 ≤ l. This definition originally applies to a dataset with feature generalization or suppression. For a synthetic sample, Park et al. (2013) suggested an analogous definition of l-diversity: A synthetic dataset is synthetically l-diverse if a synthetic sample x i is drawn from a distribution that satisfies l-diversity.
Perturbed Gibbs Sampler
In this section, we propose the Perturbed Gibbs Sampler (PeGS) for categorical synthetic data. We first overview the algorithm, then describe its three main components: feature hashing, statistical building blocks, and noise mechanism. Next, we illustrate how the PeGS algorithm can be efficiently extended to draw a block of random samples. Finally, we show that multiple imputation can be similarly extended to satisfy differential privacy, which will be used as our baseline model in Section 4.
Algorithm Overview
Perturbed Gibbs Sampler (PeGS) is a categorical data synthesizer that consists of three main steps:
1. Disintegrate: In this step, the original data D is disintegrated into statistical building blocks i.e. Pr D (x i | h(x −i )) where h is a suitable hash function. These compressed conditional distributions are estimated by counting the corresponding occurrences in the original data.
2. Inject Noise: For a specified privacy parameter α, the statistical building blocks are modified to satisfy differential privacy or l-diversity,
3. Synthesize: We first pick a random seed from a predefined pool; this can be regarded as a query to our model. The seed sample is transformed to a synthetic sample by iteratively sampling each feature from the statistical building blocks,
Figure 1 visualizes the overall sequential steps of the PeGS algorithm. Figure 2 illustrates the synthesis step. Three components are essential in the PeGS algorithm: feature hashing, statistical building blocks, and perturbation. The number of possible conditions is exponential with respect to the number of features, Therefore, feature hashing is used to compress the number of the possible conditions x −i . Statistical building blocks are built based on this feature hashing, which are essentially multiple hash-tables describing compressed conditional distributions. They serve a key role when we try to sample a block of synthetic examples. Perturbation is required to guarantee the differential privacy. Without perturbation, synthetic samples may reveal too much about the original data. Figure 1 . In the disintegration step, these three statistical building blocks are stored. In the noise injection step, the probability vectors of the tables are perturbed. In the synthesis step, a new sample is generated by iteratively sampling over the tables.
Feature Hashing
The hash function h(x −i ) in PeGS maps a feature vector to an integer key, where the range of the hash key is much smaller than 2 M (exponential in the number of features). Basically, we want to design a hash function that exhibits good compression while maintaining the statistical properties of data. The motivation is somewhat similar to feature hashing in machine learning, also known as the hashing trick, which has been often used to compress sparse high-dimensional feature vectors (Weinberger et al., 2009) . For unstructured data such as natural language texts, Locality Sensitive Hashing (Indyk and Motwani, 1998) and min-hashing (Gionis et al., 1999) can be good candidates for the PeGS hash function.
In this paper, we use a much simpler approach to compress the feature space. We order a feature vector x −i based on the amount of mutual information with x i . We divide the feature vector into two parts: the first m M number of features and the rest as follows:
where H 2 M . Let C i be the number of categories for x i , and C max = max i C i . The key space of this simple hash function is upper bounded by 2(C max )
, which is basically a occurrence count hash-table for a given hash key, can now be stored in either memory or disk. There are several advantages of using this compressed conditional distribution over parametric modeling. First, the process of building statistical building blocks does not involve complicated statistical procedures such as parameter estimation and model selection. Second, the resulting statistical building blocks are robust to overfitting. Overfitting may occur when there are not enough samples in a table entry. Hashing reduces the number of table cells and smoothes out the estimated probability vector. Finally, this simple table representation is intuitive, and the process is easily extensible. This aspect is critical in our efficient block sampling scheme, which will be illustrated in Section 3.4.
Perturbed Conditional Distribution
To satisfy the differential privacy, a certain amount of noise should be injected to the compressed conditional distributions. The form of noise may depend on applications and privacy measures. For example, noise can be added to maximize entropy (Polettini, 2003) or to satisfy l-diversity (Park et al., 2013) . In this paper, we use the Dirichlet prior perturbation to smooth out raw count based estimators to satisfy differential privacy and l-diversity. Specifically, α virtual samples are added to each category of the variable x i , when the conditional distribution Pr α (x i | h(x −i )) is estimated. The amount α is a privacy parameter that controls the degrees of differential privacy and l-diversity. To be more precise, our differentially private perturbation requires a single value of α, while our l-diverse perturbation needs different α values for each hashed condition h(x −i ) i.e. one needs to index α as α h(x−i) . This reflects the fact that differential privacy is a property of the random function, while l-diversity depends on dataset properties, an issue that will be touched upon later on. For analytical simplicity, we assume α virtual samples, α h(x−i) virtual samples for l-diversity, are uniformly added to all the categories of the variable x i (see Equation 4). In practice, different amounts of virtual samples can be added to different categories of the variable x i ; for example, α can be proportional to the corresponding marginal distribution i.e. α j ∝ Pr(x i = j).
We first derive the probability of sampling x from the PeGS algorithm. From a random seed sample s (or a query), the probability of synthesizing x is factorized as follows:
where x 1:0 and s (M +1):M are just null values. For another dataset D 2 that differs by at most one element, the probability of sampling x can be similarly derived.
For differential privacy (see Equation 2), the ratio between two quantities should satisfy the following relation:
Let us focus on the ith component as follows:
where N h(x−i) is the total number of rows that have the same hash key as h(x −i ) and n ij is the count of the jth category i.e. x i = j within the N h(x−i) samples. In other words, the probability of sampling the jth category is proportional to the number of the original samples that have the jth category. The privacy parameter α acts as a uniform Dirichlet prior on this raw multinomial count estimate. The value of α depends on the privacy criterion. We study two cases: differential privacy and l-diversity.
A. Differential Privacy. The two datasets for defining differential privacy D 1 and D 2 have at most one different row. Let us assume that D 1 has one more row than 
Given α > 0, we obtain the upper-bound for the ith component as follows:
where the first inequality is because the two datasets only differ by at most one element. The second inequality comes from the fact that
and that the equation is maximized when n ij = 0. Therefore, we obtain the relation between α and as follows:
Rearranging the terms, we have:
Note that for univariate binary synthetic data, (McClure and Reiter, 2012) showed the relationship between α and as α = 1 exp( )−1 . Equation (6) says that a higher level of privacy (low ) needs a high value of α. Intuitively, high values of α mean stronger priors, thus the synthetic data are more strongly masked by the priors (or virtual samples) .
B. l-Diversity. For l-diversity (See Equation 3), perturbed conditional distributions need to satisfy the synthetic l-diversity criterion:
is the Shannon entropy of the perturbed distribution, Pr D,α . The entropy H α is a monotonically increasing function with respect to α. To satisfy the synthetic l-diversity criterion with minimal perturbation, we set α as follows:
where α is set to zero when H α already satisfies the l-diversity criterion. Unlike the single α for differential privacy, the α values for l-diversity vary depending on conditional distributions. This is because l-diversity applies to a dataset, whereas differential privacy applies to a function. l-diversity is data-aware, but may not provide rigorous guarantees for privacy. This is also noted in (Clifton and Tassa, 2013) who observed that syntactic methods such as k-anonymity and l-diversity are designed for privacy-preserving data publishing, while differential privacy is typically applicable for privacy-preserving data mining. Thus these two approaches are not directly competing, and indeed can be used side-by-side. Clifton and Tassa (2013) also provides a detailed assessment of both the limitations and promise of both types of approaches.
Removing Sampling Footprints
This section illustrates an effective block sampling extension of PeGS, and is specific to differential privacy. PeGS generates one synthetic sample for one seed sample. In other words, one synthetic sample costs in the differential privacy regime. We modify the PeGS algorithm to sample a block of samples from one seed sample, while achieving the same -differential privacy. One sampling iteration of PeGS is now repeated many times, but each time, the visited conditional distributions are reset. The procedure of Block PeGS with Reset (PeGS.rs) is as follows:
1. Pick a random seed s from a predefined pool. To analyze the privacy aspect of this modified PeGS algorithm, we first need to calculate the probability of synthesizing a block of samples:
where Pr
) is the transition probability from b) . Note that Pr (b) and Pr
are different conditional distributions, as M components of Pr (b) are reset to the initial states. The ratio between two probabilities is written as follows:
Recall that the statistical building blocks from both datasets differ at most M components, as the two datasets differ at most one element. We provide a sketch of the proof that this algorithm satisfies -differential privacy as follows:
1. To generate the same block of samples, the sequences of statistical building blocks need to be the same as well. In other words, as the two samples,
−i | D 2 will also be the same. Thus, they use the building blocks from the same location for sampling x i at the bth iteration, Pr
There are at most M different components between Pr
(1)
D1,α and Pr
(1) D2,α , and let M be the set of different components. This is because D 1 and D 2 differ by at most one row.
If Pr
privacy cost is spent in the process (see Section 3.3).
(1) D1,α touched (M − d) components in M, then the rest of the sequences can differ at most d components. This is because those (M − d) components are reset to uniform distributions, and they became indistinguishable i.e. the visited components from D 1 and D 2 became the same uniform distribution. Every visit of an element in M decreases the number of different elements.
5. Therefore, the whole sequence can differ at most M components (upper-bound), thus the proposed block sampling algorithm satisfies the same -differential privacy for generating a block of B samples.
As we have more samples for the same cost, the privacy cost per sample can be written as:
where /B = . As can be seen, the privacy cost is smaller by a factor of B. However, the block size B cannot be arbitrarily large. As every visited statistical building block is reset, the synthetic samples tend to be more noisy as we increase the size of the block. This property will be illustrated using a real dataset in Section 4.
Perturbed Multiple Imputation
The Dirichlet perturbation similarly can be applied to multiple imputation. Perturbed Multiple Imputation is a naive extension of multiple imputation that satisfies -differential privacy. A multiple imputation with generalized linear models can be written as follows:
is the estimated response probability of x i using a generalized linear model. We assume that the response is a normalized probability measure, thus g xi ∈ [0, 1]. We propose perturbed multiple imputation as follows:
Perturbed multiple imputation satisfies -differential privacy, if the output is perturbed as
where α = 1/(exp( /M ) − 1). The proof is analogous to the proof for the PeGS algorithm. With α = 0, this algorithm is the same as a multiple imputation with generalized linear model.
Empirical Study
In this section, we evaluate the PeGS algorithm using a real dataset from two perspectives: utility and risk of the PeGS-synthesized data. The utility is measured by comparing marginal, conditional distributions and regression coefficients with those from the original data. The risk is first measured by the differential privacy parameter . As the differential privacy parameter can be too conservative for a real dataset, we also measure population uniqueness and indirect probabilistic disclosure risks. The presented experiments are mainly for the differentially private perturbation, and the experiment with the l-diversity perturbation can be found in (Park et al., 2013) .
Dataset Overview
We use public Patient Discharge Data from California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development 2 . This dataset contains inpatient, emergency care, and ambulatory surgery data collected from licensed California hospitals. Each row of the data represents either one discharge event of a patient or one outpatient encounter. The data are already processed with several disclosure limitation techniques. Feature generalization and masking rules are applied to the data based on population uniqueness. For our experiment, we use 2011 Los Angeles data. Although there are almost 40 variables in the provided data, we use 13 important variables. The selected variables are listed in Table 2 . For the numeric variables such as age and charge, we transformed the variables into categorical variables by grouping. We subset the data to focus on populous zip code areas. This is to prevent any possible privacy infringement from our experiment. We use this preprocessed dataset to be our ground-truth original data. As can be seen, the possible combinations of the categories are approximately 2 trillion: 2 × 10 12 ≈ 6 × 18 × 3 × 4 × 7 × 16 × 16 × 13 × 9 × 25 × 25 × 3 × 2. A table of this size cannot be stored in a personal computer.
Diagnostic and procedural codes are not included in this experiment. In the original data, diagnoses and procedures are coded following the rules of International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9). Both codes can specify very fine levels of diagnoses and procedures; for example, the ICD-9 codes include information about a underlying disease and a manifestation in a particular organ. These diagnostic and procedural codes can be grouped into a smaller number of categories. Major Diagnostic Categories (MDC) and Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Group (MSDRG) are two examples of coarser diagnostic codes. In this example, we only include higher level abstractions of the detailed features. To keep the semantics of the data, we recommend a two step procedure: first generating a higher level feature, then synthesizing detailed features based on the higher level feature.
Three numeric variables, age, length-of-stay (los), and charge, are grouped and transformed into categorical features. The age variable is equipartitioned to have 5 years gap between consecutive categories. The los and charge variables are grouped based on their marginal distributions. For example, almost half of the population stayed less than 10 days in a hospital. Thus, the los variable is grouped to have 1 day gap before 10 days threshold, and 20 days gap after 10 days. The charge variable exhibited a similar marginal distribution; almost a half of the population pay less than 20K dollars, and we binned this variable to have almost equal sizes of population. The grouping rules are illustrated in Table 2 . In Section 5, we will discuss the limitations and extension of treating numeric variables in the PeGS framework.
Sampling Demonstration
PeGS transforms each feature one by one conditioned on the rest of the features. This approach differs from a multiple imputation strategy in two aspects. First, PeGS estimates compressed conditional distributions rather than parameterized approximations e.g., generalized linear models. Second, the compressed conditional distributions can be further perturbed by calibrating the privacy parameter, which makes synthetic data -differentially private. Table 3 shows how PeGS transforms a random seed into a private synthetic sample. The first row of the table is a random seed, and each consecutive row shows the corresponding sampling step. Note that some features change their values, whereas other features maintain the original Table 3 : Detailed Sampling Steps in the PeGS synthesis step. Four variables, sex, race, payment categoryvalues. The final sample is shown in the last row. As can be seen, the final transformed sample is different from the seed; for example, it has a different age, zip code, and disposition code.
Unlike multiple imputation, PeGS can be iterated many times. However, without the reset option, there is no gain for the privacy cost. The reset option in PeGS.rs removes sampling footsteps, but the synthetic samples after many iterations may not be useful for representing the original data. Figure 4 shows histograms from the generated samples. As can be seen, the block samples from PeGS.rs are more uniformly distributed than those from PeGS. The distributions from PeGS are actually closer to the distribution of the original data than those from PeGS.rs. It is important to note that the PeGS and PeGS.rs in this experiment have different privacy cost; PeGS.rs only used , while PeGS requires × Iterations. The goal of this experiment is to show the limitation of PeGS.rs. Although PeGS.rs provides more number of samples given the same privacy cost, an arbitrarily large size of block may not be useful in practice. 
Risk ( ) vs. Utility
Reducing disclosure risk and improving data utility are two competing objectives when publishing privacysafe synthetic data. As these two goals cannot be satisfied at the same time, a certain trade-off is necessary for preparing public use data. This trade-off has been traditionally represented using a graphical measure, called R-U confidentiality map (Duncan et al., 2001 ). The R-U confidentiality map consists of two axis: typically a risk measure on the x-axis and a utility measure on the y-axis. Note that risk and utility measures can be domain and application specific. In this paper, we first show R-U maps where the risk is measured using differential privacy. The utility is primarily measured by comparing statistics from the original data and synthetic data. We use three different algorithms and seven different privacy parameters for each algorithm as follows:
• PeGS: Perturbed Gibbs Sampler
• PeGS.rs: Perturbed Gibbs Block Sampler with Reset. Block size = 10.
• PMI: Perturbed Multiple Imputation (baseline algorithm). With higher values of , this is the same as a multiple imputation strategy for fully synthetic data. In PMI, the conditional distributions are modeled using the elastic-net regularized multinomial logistic regression, specifically glmnet package in R 2.15.3 (Friedman et al., 2010) . The variable x i is regressed on the rest of the variables x −i , and the regularization parameter λ was tuned based-on cross-validation:
where c ij and β ij are estimated from the data.
where the privacy parameters are given as ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1, 5, 10, 50, 100} per synthetic sample. We generated 1000 samples for each case. As a result, we have 21 = 7 × 3 synthetic datasets and one original dataset. The utility is first measured using marginal and conditional distributions. Marginal and conditional distributions are measured from the original and synthetic datasets, then the distance is calculated as follows:
where the distance is an inverse surrogate for the utility. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the R-U maps where the utility is measured as the difference in marginal and conditional distributions, respectively. As can be seen, all synthetic datasets become similar to the original data with higher values of . However, for smaller values of , the synthetic data from PeGS.rs are much more similar to the original than the others. The distributional distances of PeGS are slightly smaller than those of PeGS.rs for higher values of . Since α values are very small for these privacy parameters, the reset operation of PeGS.rs becomes more noticeable, and it pushes synthetic samples away from the original distributions.
Next, we compare the coefficients from regression models learned on the datasets. We learned logistic and linear models as follows:
I(charge > 25K) ∼ as.numeric(age.yrs) + sev + cat + as.numeric (los) as.numeric(charge) ∼ as.numeric(age.yrs) + sev + cat + as.numeric(los) where some of the features are changed to numeric features based on their actual meaning. The choice of the target variable was arbitrary, as the goal of this illustrative experiment is to show the applicability of synthetic data in predictive modeling tasks. After learning the coefficients of each model, the distance between the coefficients is measured as follows: Figure 7 shows the R-U map from the regression experiment. As can be seen, the synthetic samples from PeGS.rs provide the most similar coefficients to those from the original data. Figure 8 shows each coefficient deviation from the linear regression example for two different differential privacy levels. Notice that the intercept coefficients from the synthetic datasets tend to overshoot the actual value, while the other feature coefficients tend to undershoot. This is because the perturbation decreases all feature correlations including the correlation between the target and independent variables.
Estimating Re-identification Risk
Although differential privacy provides a theoretically sound framework for measuring disclosure risks, the measure is originally designed for functions, not data (Dankar and Emam, 2012) . For many cases, the measures can be overly conservative or strict for a real dataset. In the statistical disclosure limitation literature, there have been many attempts to measure disclosure risks for synthetic data. Franconi and Stander (2002) proposed a method to quantify disclosure risks for model-based synthetic data. Their proposed approach checks whether it is possible to recognize a unit in the released data assuming the original data are given to an intruder. This provides a somewhat conservative measure, but is still useful to compare the risks from different release mechanisms. Reiter (2005b) later formalized measuring probabilistic disclosure risk scores for partially or fully synthetic data. Probabilistic disclosure risks are used to asses the risks of the fully synthetic data using Random Forests in Caiola and Reiter (2010) . In this paper, we measure the disclosure risks from two different angles: recoverability of feature values and population uniqueness. First, we examine whether it is possible to infer the values of sensitive feature given demographic information. Specifically, if the intruder knows someone's age, sex, los, and zip, we would like to measure the likelihood of getting the correct values as follows:
where the inferred values are (1) the most frequent MDC categories and (2) sample means from conditioned synthetic samples. We also measure the population uniqueness based on age, sex, and zip code information. Figure 9 shows the results from this simulated intruder experiment. Private records are more difficult to reconstruct if misclassification rates and absolute errors are high. The probability of recovering MDC is significantly lower than using a simple bootstrap method, but no one method is distinctly better than the other. The absolute distance of hospital charges shows that synthetic data has comparable predictive power with the bootstrap method. Noticeably, the absolute errors are higher when the differential privacy parameters are low, and this finding partially supports our use of differential privacy as a disclosure risk measure. As can be seen in Figure 9 (right), the perturbed synthetic datasets have more unique samples. This is the most distinct characteristics of PeGS compared to other statistical disclosure techniques. Privacy preserving algorithms, such as k-anonymity and l-diversity, try to reduce population uniqueness, while PeGS increases the diversity of samples. The former algorithms apply privacy-preserving transforms on the original data, while the latter algorithm synthesizes a diversified dataset.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proposed a categorical data synthesizer that guarantees prescribed differential privacy or l-diversity levels. The use of a hash function allows the Perturbed Gibbs Sampler to handle high-dimensional categorical data. The non-parametric modeling of categorial data provides a flexible alternative to traditional (GLM-based) Multiple Imputation techniques. Additionally, this simple representation of conditional distributions is a crucial component of our block sampling algorithm, which enhances the utility of synthetic data given a fixed privacy budget.
The California Patient Discharge dataset was used to demonstrate the analytical validity and utility of the proposed synthetic methodologies. Marginal and conditional distributions, as well as regression coefficients of predictive models learned from the synthesized data were compared to those from the original data to quantify the amount of distortion introduced by the synthesization process. Simulated intruder scenarios were studied to show the confidentiality of the synthesized data. The empirical studies showed that the proposed mechanisms can provide useful risk-calibrated synthetic data.
Currently, PeGS only deals with categorical variables. Numeric variables need to be binned to form categorical variables. Although this approach may be good enough for some applications, brute-force binning ignores numeric similarity or ordering information. For example, two consecutive values from an ordinal variable are more similar than separated values. Consider a size variable with three values: small, medium, and large. The ordering information states that similarity(small, medium) > similarity(small, big), but this information is lost if we bin the size variable into three (non-ordered) categories. Such semantic correlation cannot be captured in the current synthetic and perturbation model.
In addition to the perturbation step, the hashing step of PeGS also provides some degrees of privacy protection, although it was originally designed for computational efficiency. When building the PeGS statistical building blocks, each row x of the original data is hashed based on h(x −i ), and aggregated with other rows with the same hash key, {z | h(z −i ) = h(x −i )}. Although, in this paper, the privacy guarantee of PeGS is analyzed from the perturbation perspective, this aggregation (or hashing) step should be also incorporated for a tighter guarantee of privacy. The privacy guarantee of PeGS would be affected by different hash resolutions and mechanisms, and this topic needs to be covered in future work.
Although the proposed algorithms show better performance on -differential privacy and l-diversity 3 measures, they were only marginally better than the perturbed multiple imputation in other probabilistic disclosure risk measures. The differential privacy measure may be too conservative for real data, and the probabilistic measure may not exhaustively capture all the attack scenarios. This is why we provided multiple risk measures. The connection between the differential privacy and disclosure risks should be further addressed to better evaluate the validity and utility of the synthetic data. In practice, multiple disclosure techniques are sequentially mixed to achieve better protection of the records. For example, PeGS can be applied on top of feature generalization or masking techniques. Furthermore, some features can be modeled using generalized linear models; for example, numeric features. It would be worthwhile to investigate cocktails of different statistical disclosure limitation techniques.
